by Kevin Walker
University of California, Berkeley
1991

Introduction

Edward Said has characterized a perception of the Middle East by the "West" (meaning Europe and the United States) which essentializes and simplifies, and regards the Middle East as "an object of knowledge and domination" (1978:2). This attitude he calls "Orientalist." In this paper I will examine coverage of the present round of peace talks in the Middle East in four Western publications, to see if this Orientalist attitude frames their coverage, and to explore other attitudes and presuppositions that affect news coverage of the region.

This involves several assumptions on my part. For example, I believe that Orientalism exists, and the news media both reflect and perpetuate it, as I will show. But this ideology is not without foundation, and the political and economic forces behind it will be explored. In this critique, I also assume that the news media have a certain degree of power. Politics inevitably infuses such a discussion, particularly one regarding the Middle East, for it resides in symbols and code words such as "security", "status quo", "international consensus" and "rejectionism". Through my methodology, I try to maintain a constant self-critique.

Methodology and Perspective

I will examine the New York Times, London Times, Economist and New Republic. For the period surveyed, October 19 (a day after formal invitations to the conference were issued) to November 2, (a day after the opening round of the talks ended), I deliberately avoided reading about the peace talks in these periodicals. Instead, I read a variety of other articles and books with diverse perspectives, to determine the issues at stake, the actors involved, and their respective interests. (These articles and books are listed in the bibliography.)

A discussion of the information I gleaned from these sources -- background of the conflict, issues, actors and their interests -- makes up the first part of the study. For the second part, the content analysis, I then turned to the four selected periodicals and analyzed the amount of space each devoted to the story, the space given to each of the actors, and the amount and type of interpretation by both journalists and commentators. From this information, I attempt to construct the frames through which each publication views the region, the specific actors, and the conference.

My perspective derives from my anthropological studies. The upheavals in the social sciences beginning in the 1960's exposed the myth of "objective" observation, and the recognition of Orientalism is but one of these upheavals. I recognize the cultural bias in my interpretations, and I do not claim that my observations are somehow universal, nor do I try to assume a "native" viewpoint. Instead, my approach seeks to view the event from as many diverse perspectives as possible, all the while realizing that I automatically add my own presuppositions to those, selecting and interpreting them. This is why I chose a wide spectrum of "background" readings, then compared the four selected periodicals to what I had learned from them.

My approach incorporates what Todd Gitlin calls "cubist sociology" and what Laura Nader calls "post-interpretive anthropology". Such multivocality doesn't necessarily arrive at "truth" any more than journalists' conceptions of "objectivity" and "balance" do; but it offers more diverse views from which one can choose. The reader should also note that the tendency to place things and people in categories is by no means a solely Western phenomenon; the process of simplifying and categorizing is the main function of all languages.

Background: The Arab-Israeli Conflict

The peace conference represents the first direct talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors in nearly 44 years. Since Israel's creation in 1948, Arab countries have embargoed, boycotted and fought it outright. Gamel Abdel Nasser heightened the conflict after he came to power in Egypt in 1954, calling for a unifed Arab effort against Israel. In 1956, Israel annexed Egypt's Sinai peninsula; but cease-fires were arranged between Israel and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

In 1967 the conflict again erupted in the Six-Day War. A United Nations resolution after that war asked Israel to give up captured land in return for Arab recognition of its borders; this resolution has gone largely unheeded and is an issue in the present conference. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria. Syria was joined by Egypt and Saudi Arabia against Israel in that war, (the same Arab countries who would join against Iraq 17 years later. The oil embargo following the war sent economic shock waves around the world for the rest of the decade.

Against the backdrop of the oil embargo and the Cold War, U.S. diplomacy culminated in the Camp David accords in September, 1978. Israel returned Sinai to Egypt in return for Egyptian recognition, but Israel retained the Golan Hights, as well as the West Bank, which it had captured from Jordan. Arab nations reacted to Camp David by cutting diplomatic relations with Egypt. But the peace between Egypt and Israel remains "cold": it is mostly formal in character.

Most other Arab nations have thus far shown no interest in making peace with Israel, and some have used the "Jewish threat" as a scapegoat to suppress human rights and political participation in their own countries. The banner of Arab nationalism (qawmiyya) begun by Nasser became, after his death in 1970, mostly symbolic. But it had practical consequences: Arab leaders have used it to magnify conflicts between Arabs and non-Arab enemies; to buttress the domestic standing of non-elected regimes; and to help governments draw attention to external threats and away from ethnic conflicts at home. Indeed, the Baathist governments of Iraq and Syria -- both wracked by ethnic and sectarian splits -- have been the most fervent proponents of qawmiyya.

In the last dozen years, several key events have disrupted regional stability: the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iran-Iraq war which followed it, the situation in Lebanon, and Western intervention, most notably the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in 1988 and the recent Gulf conflict. The latter event is important because it effectively laid qawmiyya to rest: several Arab states broke their longstanding prohibition against getting overt help from the United States (Israel's friend and supporter). This laid bare the extent to which the West has "managed" the affairs of the region, but it also shattered a symbolic barrier with the West.

The collapse of pan-Arabism is analagous to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. One result is that there is now more attention by Arab leaders to the sanctity of borders, instead of a conception of a pan-Arab state without borders. Victorious Arab allies are trying to consolidate their individual gains from the war, not rebuild Arab unity. The Arab League still exists, however, but it has been transformed by the Gulf conflict. Its last big summit, in Baghdad in May, 1990, was called to discuss the "economic strangulation of Israel." In contrast, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, an emergency meeting of the League in Cairo called for Iraq's withdrawal; Egypt controls the organization today.

The Issues

The main issue and overarching theme of the conference is land for peace. This is outlined in United Nations resolutions 242 and 338, which call for Israel to withdraw from the territories it has occupied, in exchange for Arab recognition and peace. These resolutions are accepted by many Palestinians, but rejected by Israelis. Most Arab parties refuse to sign any treaty unless Israel gives back all the land it has occupied.

There are several interwoven issues which complicate this goal. First, there is the program of Jewish settlement in the occupied territories. This has been heightened by the arrival of Soviet Jews in large numbers since last Summer, and in the West Bank and the settlement program is now the biggest ever. Israel's Housing Minister, Ariel Sharon began escalating settlements earlier this year; Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir at first denied knowledge of this, then publicly endorsed it.

Also complicating the land issue is Palestinians' ultimate goal of having their own state. While some are willing to settle for autonomy under Israeli rule, many see this as an interim step towards statehood; others will settle for nothing less than immediate and complete statehood. The status of Jeruselam must also be considered, for it is currently divided among several national groups.

Other issues, which are expected to be addressed in a later phase of the talks, include long-term, regional problems such as water rights and arms control. The former is largely a matter to be solved by the various Mideast countries, and is perhaps the most crucial long-term issue. Arms control involves outside parties, especially the U.S. and Europe, and must be addressed in a global forum such as the United Nations. Especially critical in this area are nuclear weapons, possessed by Israel and desired by several Arab countries, if for no other reason than to counter Israel's stockpile. Western countries frame this issue mainly in terms of terrorist threats, yet in the past such threats have been directed mainly at Arab countries and not Israel. The Middle East has been at the heart of the politico-ideological dichotomy of East-West, with certain countries supported with U.S. arms and money, and others by the Soviets.

There are several peripheral issues which must be mentioned briefly. The Gulf conflict, for one, casts a long shadow over the talks, underscoring the extent of Western intervention in the Middle East. Israel's overflights of Iraq just before the peace talks, denounced by the U.S., showed this. The role of Western arms in the region hangs over the conference as well. The U.S. would like to keep arms stockpiled in some Gulf countries, but some, such as Saudi Arabia, prefer to buy their own.

Hostage issues also are related to the talks. A flurry of hostage releases preceded the conference, lending optimism and bargaining power to both sides. Finally, the fate of Lebanon is at issue. Syria now essentially controls the Lebanese government, but Israel continues attacks in the southern part of the country; these have continued throughout the talks.

External influence in the region is the primary current underlying the peace talks. Each of the participants has joined the talks in order to either gain the favor of the U.S. or to avoid antagonizing it. The cooperation between the U.S. and Soviet Union has proved contagious; their communication is much freer than in the Cold War, when the two sides could be played off of eachother by Mideast governments.

This point was underscored in a "mock peace conference" held a week before the actual one, which went unnoticed by the media . It was attended by former generals, diplomats and scholars from the Middle East, and held in Moscow. No startling revelations came from the event, but because it was held away from the glare of cameras, the participants found it easy to reach compromises. There were no officials present, but those who attended were well connected with their respective governments, and their findings may have found their way into the "real" peace talks, which are deliberately very visible and media-friendly.

The Actors and Their Interests

Due to space and time limitations, and for the reader's sake, I have narrowed and simplified the actors involved. I will discuss the United States, Israel, the Palestinians, and Syria. Jordan is not included because its interests are perceived to be similar to the Palestinians', and in fact the two attended the talks together in a joint delegation. Lebanon is not included because its interests are viewed as similar to those of Syria, which in effect controls the Lebanese government. The Soviet Union is not included because its role is mostly symbolic, serving to lend an air of compromise and bilateral friendship. These neglected interests will, however, emerge in the content analysis, but here I deal with who are perceived to be the "main players."

Content Analysis: Methodological Considerations

To analyze the two newspapers, I compared several variables. First, I counted the amount of space each one devoted to the conference. This included "hard news" coverage (general reportage of the events leading up to and including the peace conference); editorials; op-ed pieces; and "news analysis" pieces. Excerpts from the talks, biographical sketches, cartoons, or illustrations were not included, because I limited the count to words written by reporters, editors, editorial writers and guest writers. Photos were counted separately, however, and the other items are mentioned in the discussion, which characterizes the overall coverage and tone of all the publications. I also restricted the analysis to stories specifically related to the conference; hence related stories such as violence in the occupied territories were not used, (though this became difficult for the London Times, since it tended to include several different events in a single story).

Next, I counted the sources in each story, and categorized them by nationality. While doing this, I ran into some semantic problems. What exactly is a source? Is it a person? What about unnamed persons? A group of people or an organization? A statement released by a government or party? A television interview with a person, or a previously published interview that has been quoted by the reporter? How about a banner at a rally? And when is what a "source" says news? Is it what was said yesterday, or last week, or what the source may have written previously?

These questions which enlightened me to the various ways reporters obtain information, and forced me to define "source" somewhat narrowly. I settled on a definition that includes persons (named or unnamed), groups and organizations. Hence a firsthand account of some event by the reporter is not included in the count, but is discussed later in the context of reporters' biases and interpretations. I deemed that the information should be "fresh": no more than a day or two old; it must be new information the reader hasn't yet encountered. Written sources were included, such as official statements. And finally, I included when a reporter quoted a source from another paper or a TV interview, since this information might be new to the reader. The source count shows the number of sources from a particular country in each story, and the cumulative daily totals reflect the number of different sources used by the paper that day. It appears in Appendix I.

Within this, there were still other problems. I chose my categories carefully, but I was still somewhat foiled. The biggest problem was with the Palestinian delegates: are they affiliated with the PLO? I distinguished PLO sources from "Other Palestinian" sources because the PLO is the biggest and most cited -- but by no means the only -- Palestinian organization; Yassir Arafat is the single most cited Palestinian source, which says something about his media accessibility and Western reporters' conventions. I ultimately deemed the Palestinian delegates "Other Palestinians" because "officially" they were not with the PLO. (At the conference, however, it came out that they "were" the PLO, in effect.)

There were other vague distinctions, for instance, how to categorize an "Arab official" or a "Western Diplomat"? How many sources are "Administration officials"? I used my own judgement and what information I could read between the lines, and happily, the "Other" category did not end up overflowing. Sources were counted in "news analysis" pieces, (which are much more clearly labeled in the New York Times than the London Times), since these often come from "background briefings" by unnamed sources, combined with the writer's own interpretations. But sources were not counted in editorials or opinion pieces, since these are often the writer's opinion and don't often include sources. These figured into the count of column inches, however.

For the magazines, a much looser means of analysis was used because of the differential styles of the two. Here, I relied mainly on my own critical faculties to discern what the writers' viewpoints are, what presuppositions and biases they might have, where they might get their information and external factors such as their organizational and cultural settings. Then these were compared with the findings from the dailies. This resulted in a much shorter analysis than of the dailies, because it was less rigorous methodologically. Overall, in assessing all four of the publications' frames, I looked at sources, story selection, geographical deployment of reporters, and reporters' particular interpretations and assumptions. The unit of analysis was individuals (reporters and sources) more than stories, for each individual was categorized and compared. In assessing the frames used by the publications, I was in essence comparing them with my own frames, which I acquired from the previous readings and my own experiences.

Analysis and Interpretation: The Dailies

Overall, there were many similarities between the New York Times and London Times, and this is reflected in the source table and pie charts (Appendix I). Generally, their coverage was thorough and somewhat balanced, and they note many of the same points as periodicals from around the world.

This doesn't necessarily mean that just because information appears in several, diverse publications, it is "true", for "truth" is often more elusive than that. But wide dissemination of information does give it credibility and legitimacy, and people act on it; it takes on a life of its own, in a sense. One other point must be said regarding "truth". Many statements that are construed as ethnocentric or stereotypical usually contain some degree of fact; they differ in the impression that comes across. The differences appear in the assumptions and subtle use of words, images and symbols; on what Michel Foucault calls the "archaeological level" of analysis.

One of the reasons that so much information is so widely disseminated is because it comes from the same sources, who often have some interest in spreading certain information. This is the case with U.S. foreign policy, and as Herbert Gans, Todd Gitlin and others have said, the American media often follow U.S. foreign policy closely when it comes to international news: it frames their coverage. This is due to scarcity of resources, and politico-ideological factors.

Strangely enough, I found that the London Times actually is more active in this regard than the New York Times, which is often criticized as the official voice of the U.S. government. In the Middle East peace conference, the U.S. -- and to some extent Israel -- have defined the terms of debate, and this is followed by both the London and New York Times, as well as by the participants in the conference.

In this regard, it is helpful to know just what U.S. foreign policy is toward the region. Based on past experience and present perceptions, it can be seen that the Mideast is the main target of U.S. intervention, often for economic and/or military-strategic reasons. To justify this requires a kind of "politicization of the American public" regarding the Middle East, a kind of creation of the region in the media, involving selective coverage, selective history ("historical engineering" as Chomsky calls it), the creation of stereotypes, and setting the terms of debate. One method is framing U.S. intervention in terms of "international consensus". This is evident, for example, in a New York Times story citing "international pressures" that drove the parties to the negotiating table (Oct. 20).

The creation and perpetuation of stereotypes also has served U.S. policies. An image of super-rich shieks coincided with the oil crises of the 1970's, for instance. Now, that image has been replaced by stone-throwing Palestininan "militants" and colorfully-speaking fundamentalist leaders like Saddam Hussein. Arab governments are often seen as irresponisble autocracies, and "terrorism" is is viewed as endemic to the region, with no foundation in prior conflicts or grievances, rather an outgrowth of "fundamentalism" and ancient ethnic hatreds.

In some cases these stereotypes are the result of a kind of collaboration between the subjects and the media. This view presupposes that the presence of reporters changes an event, a view popularized by Marshall McLuhan, which stands against the "mirror" analogy which holds that the media merely reflect events. In this regard, it is true that Palestinian demontrators, for example, know what type of behavior will attract news coverage. It is clear that at the peace talks, the media play a large part, and appearances are everything.

At the conference, body language was much noted, as will be seen. An Arab penchant for symbols is often contrasted with an Israeli preference for "substance". The symbolic presence of the two superpowers enhanced the visibility of the talks, as did the re-establishment, right before the talks, of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviets. This was emphasized in a front-page photo in the New York Times of the two nations' flags together (Oct. 19).

The peace conference was not necessarily a "pseudo-event" to use Daniel Boorstin's term, for it served a very real purpose, but the publicity aspect was clear. A comment by the New York Times' Thomas Friedman alluded to this aspect, when he compared the talks to a play or opera, saying "Act One" was now underway, and wondering if there would even be an "Act Two" (Oct. 20). Evident in this comment is the theatricality of the event.

Related to the theatricality is a skepticism about the substance of the talks, which runs throughout the coverage. Friedman, for instance, underscores this in a "news analysis" piece on Oct. 20 entitled "Peace Talks but no Dove." Most of his sources for this article are diplomats, who he says have been so caught up in the details of planning that they haven't really thought about the issues. (Surely by this time Friedman could find someone who had.)

The London Times is even more pessimistic. Richard Beeston notes, for example, that "while mutual Israeli and Syrian suspicions will certainly persist beyond the opening bilateral talks... both countries are aware that it is only a matter of time before the Jewish state once again finds itself at war with its neighbors -- unless a suitable compromise is found" (Oct. 26).

This also points out the preference for moderatism, another frame running throughout. Other London Times articles are entitled "Only hatred in common" and "Table d'hate". The latter piece recalls the Cairo summit of the Arab League during the Gulf conflict, which, it says, culminated in flying food and plates. Another London Times reporter, Christopher Walker, observes that perhaps the gloom may be perpetrated by U.S. officials, who "have repeatedly reminded reporters of the difficulties and said that a breakdown in Madrid is a strong possibility" (Oct. 21).

Inevitably, the coverage is framed in terms of conflict and drama, and heralds compromise and moderatism as ideals. There are many stories from the borders between Arabs and Israelis, such as Walker's Oct. 24 article from Sinai (which, to his credit, he doesn't affiliate with either Israel or Egypt). He views it as a "bridge" between the two peoples, a symbol of compromise. Beeston's Oct. 26 article from Golan Heights emphasizes its "strategic" (meaning military) importance. He relies overwhelmingly on Israeli sources here.

The frame of conlfict also includes expected conflict, as seen in the London Times' Oct. 24 observation that the atmosphere surrounding the talks "hasn't yet turned violent". There is some fact -- past experience -- involved in these assumptions. But even at the formal talks themselves, there is an expectation of confrontation. The New York Times' Joel Brinkley says that the negotiators will be "looking into the faces of their most hated enemies -- in many cases for the first time" (Oct. 27). On the first day of the talks, there are no speeches by the negotiators but "furtive glances", "blank stares" and other body language; much ado is made about hand-shaking. Two New York Times observers compare the atmosphere of the talks to the weather outside, except (and this shows how individuals make different interpretations), while Alan Cowell sees fog outside, R.W. Apple, Jr. sees smog (Oct. 30).

News often is what individuals do or say, and especially individuals in conflict. This is the ironic appeal of the peace talks. The frame of individuals in conflict is evident in the counterimposed pictures of Shamir and a Palestinian negotiator, side by side on the front page of the New York Times on Nov. 1. The London Times' Beeston, meanwhile, pits Israeli and Palestinian negotiators against eachother, and sizes them up. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, (known as "Bibi", as Beeston says), is a master of the "sound bite" and star of the Persian Gulf conflict. Hanan Ashrawi, on the other hand, is an "ordinary looking, middle aged Palestinian mother of two" and "her articulate and unemotional arguments, her sense of humor, and sensible suits may be more in tune with the mood of Madrid than the more pugnacious style of her Israeli rival". Or, we might add, than the style of her more raucous Palestinian colleagues. She appears to break the stereotype of the veiled, passive, oppressed fundamentalist Arab woman, and this makes her worthy of praise.

In Gans's terminology, there are "knowns" and "unknowns" in conflict in the peace conference story. The "unknowns" are represented in several reports from the occupied territories or the borders, as in Beeston's aforementioned story, "Only hatred in common". Perhaps the most visible of the "knowns" is James Baker. He was perceived to be in conflict with almost all the parties during his months of shuttle diplomacy, and he is heralded as a hero for getting the long-time antagonists to sit down and talk. The London Times especially praises him, for instance calling him the "chief peacemaker" (Oct. 21) and referring to "Baker's scheme" throughout.

The sense of individuals in conflict is inherent in stories about nations in conflict, since countries are often anthropomorphized or identified by their leaders. Related to this is the frame of the bilateral world: the division of the world into two halves and the placement of nations in one or the other half. This is the central assumption underlying Orientalism and the frame of anticommunism. The Soviets are noted in the coverage as having backed the "PLO, Syria and other Arab militants" while the U.S. has "fought to keep the Soviet Union at bay". But the frame has become perceived as one of the past. The USSR is now a "junior partner to the U.S.," having forfeited its role as manager of the Middle East (NYT Oct. 25). The end of the Cold War is viewed as a main force behind the conference, but in fact it had little to do with many of the region's internal conflicts aside from the arming and financing of participants. Related to the division of the world is an ongoing division between "hawks" and "doves". In this vein, for instance, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy is "relatively dovish" next to his Prime Minister (NYT Oct. 24).

Whether or not the world is truly divided into binary opposites, the fact is that individuals view "others" from their own particular frame of reference. This is the assumption behind the idea of ethnocentrism, a Western viewpoint by which others are judged. "We" are viewed in the media as the democratic, "civilized" West, and things and people which are more "Westernized" (that is, more like us) are viewed as better. For Western journalists, such ethnocentrism is necessary, for their audience is also Western, and they both must share a common frame of reference to understand eachother. Thus Beeston compares a Jewish settlement to a "middle class suburb in California," save for the metal grates across cars' windscreens; a Palestinian refugee camp is compared to "many of South Africa's grimmest townships" (LT Oct. 22).

Because journalists are generalists, they rarely stay in one place long enough to become fully versed in its local customs. Walker, on Oct. 28, compares the facilities for foreign journalists in Israel and the "Arab world". He found Israel pleasant, with a government press office, computerized systems, and free translation of Hebrew; this was "hindered only by military censorship". Arab countries, while they rarely have military censorship, have other problems, he notes, for instance Lebanon is "too dangerous", Egypt is "too uncomfortable" and Jordan is "too restrictive". In other words, Israel, while more "Westernized", is also more "media-friendly", and consciously so.

Knowing a native language is helpful in overcoming ethnocentrism, and in the coverage, certain Arabic- and Hebrew-speaking journalists can be distinguished by the sources they cite. For instance, Alan Cowell wrote a piece on the tension between Arab and Israeli journalists, but spoke to three Israeli journalists. At the very end of the article, he says, "The Arabs had their views too..." and quotes an Omani reporter. In contrast, Youssef Ibrahim includes a wide range of Arab sources in his articles, giving the impression that he speaks Arabic. Clyde Haberman interviews many Israelis, so presumably he speaks Hebrew. (All three reporters are with the New York Times).

One aspect of ethnocentrism is the convention of speaking in metaphors of certain subcultures. Coverage of the peace talks was liberally sprinkled with the language of sports and of the military. There are the "two former superpower contestants" (NYT Oct. 25); the U.S. is the "referee" (Oct. 20) and has a "game plan" (LT Oct. 20) to "prompt from the sidelines without distracting the players" (NYT 10.27). Because it was "quietly coaching" the participants, the Palestinians were prepared to "cry 'foul'". Each country has its own "roster" or "team". The London Times profiles "The Players" on Oct. 27: Baker, Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin, Arafat, Syria's Assad, and Jordan's King Hussein, in that order. Two days later, it had changed this "lineup" to the "Main Players": the US, USSR, Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan and Syria, in that order. Line drawings in the former profile are replaced with photos in the second one. There are several metaphors from boxing: "in one corner" (NYT Oct. 23) are the Arabs, who "must do more than their usual shadow-boxing" (LT Oct. 25); the Palestinians "sparred" with journalists upon their arrival at the talks (NYT Oct. 30). Other sports metaphors included the removal of "a final hurdle" (LT Oct. 23), "seating gymnastics" and "hardball tactics" (NYT Oct. 27). Peace, of course, is a "prize" (LT Oct. 27). And there is an inevitable comparison to a bullfight in the New York Times.

Military analogies include the "war of nerves" (NYT Oct. 23) and "battle of the flags" (LT Oct. 31). Instead of "teams" there are "camps" (LT Oct. 21). In one interesting analogy, Andrew Hogg and Roy Isacovitz begin a story noting Baker's enthusiasm for hunting wild turkeys in his leisure time. Two related photos of Shamir and Baker are captioned "hunted and hunter" (LT Oct. 20). Baker "cut off all Shamir's lines of retreat"; Shamir was "outmanÏvred by Baker's tactical skills" so he intended to "torpedo the conference" (NYT Oct. 24). This led to "damage control attempts" (NYT Oct. 26).

Behind this ethnocentrism are some very real instances of United States "management" of the affairs of the region. These came to light in certain word choices. The New York Times spoke of Israeli distrust of "American goodwill" (Oct. 20); the conference was referred to as "James Baker's peace talks" (LT Oct. 22) or the "United States-engineered peace conference" (NYT Oct. 25); the palace where the talks are held is "suitably imposing" (LT Oct. 30). An unnamed "senior American official" summed up the sense of U.S. management when he said, "We just thought if we don't make it happen in October, it very likely won't happen, this being the Middle East" (NYT Oct. 19). Perhaps most telling, the Palestinians refer "half-jokingly" to Bush as "president of the world" (NYT Nov. 1).

Closely tied to this paternal aspect is a string of childhood metaphors: Israel being like "a stubborn child" (NYT Oct. 19); All the participants as "unruly pupils" (NYT Oct. 20); Syria "orphaned by" the Soviet Union. After the first day of the talks, The New York Times' Cowell compares to the delegates to "youths at their first prom" and London's Beeston says they are "like reluctant adolescent boys and girls attending their first school dance" (Oct. 31). Despite the cultural and linguistic differences inherent in these two phrases, they are nearly identical; did Cowell and Beeston talk about this?

Within the ethnocentric framework, Israel is naturally less "foreign" than the Arab nations, and a distinct bias toward Israel comes through in both papers. On one level, Israel is most often mentioned first in a list of participants, or they may be listed as "Israel and its neighbors", although this is somewhat trivial, and it may be merely a stylistic convention to group all the Arab nations together. But other linguistic subtleties are not so trivial: for instance, compare Palestinian "refugees" with Israeli "pioneers," "settlers" or even "the pioneering Jewish settlers' movement" (LT Oct. 24). This conjures, to the Western mind, images of the old American frontier. A halt of Israeli settlements would be a "goodwill gesture" by the Israelis, but not so the intifada. Israeli's insistence on Palestinian representation (that they must not be affiliated with the PLO or from East Jerusalem) goes unquestioned in the two papers; and the PLO is widely regarded as a "terrorist organization" even though most Palestinians belong to it, many of whom are peaceful. Israeli "preconditions" are contrasted with Palestinian "obstacles".

What the Palestinians have been striving for, more than anything else in the talks, is equal recognition. But any efforts to accord equal rights to all parties is branded "rejectionist" by Israel, and the two papers follow this framework blindly. Chomsky has decried this one-sided rhetoric in which the U.S. and Israel are viewed as "yearning for peace" and pursuing a "peace process" while waiting for Arabs to reconcile their demands to the Israelis'. This attitude persists, most strongly at the New York Times. A.M. Rosenthal expresses this pro-Israeli sentiment openly in his Oct. 22 column: "If a higher standard of ethics and conduct is demanded of Israelis," he says, "it is because even its antagonists know it judges itself on democratic and political standards unknown elsewhere in the Middle East." He goes on to describe an "arsenal of deadly weapons against Israel that the world chooses to ignore" which includes racial insults, "terrorism", boycott and embargo, etc. This accords with the belief that anyone against Israeli policies is automatically anti-Semitic. I wonder -- and I am treading onto speculative ground here -- if this might be part of an organizational bias at the paper, reflecting the religious and political beliefs of the paper's management and publisher.

Despite this bias, there is simultaneously a sense of Israel being "managed" by the U.S. along with the Arab countries; this accords with changes in US foreign policy. An interview with Shamir, for instance, in the New York Times says he "accentuates the positives, but can't eliminate the negatives" and portrays Israeli Foreign Minister Levy, by contrast, as "genuinely enthusiastic" about peace.

There are many more disparaging words about Arabs, however, especially at the New York Times. They are Israel's "hostile Arab neighbors" for instance (Oct. 21) whose "guerilla attacks" stand in contrast to Israeli "security measures" (Oct. 28). Most anti-Arab bias is directed specifically against the Palestinians, who are portrayed as the main perpetrators of violence in the region. The intifada is widely referred to as terrorism. In light of the conference, they are seen as "ready for peace".

Rosenthal, in the Oct. 22 column, hails "the decision of some Palestinians not to let yet another opportunity pass them by", but he goes on to claim that "Jordan is Palestine" and the Palestinians should not ask for another homeland. He ignores past peace attempts made by Arafat, and the fact that historically, Palestine was halfway in modern-day Israel as well as Jordan. Palestinians opposed to the talks are "militant" or "radical dissenters". There is some fact to this, since there were in fact death threats directed at the conference by some Palestinian factions; but the label is broadened to include all opposed to it.

Israeli dissenters, on the other hand, are "hardline". The Palestinians "have been weakened by a string of miscalculations" including their support for Iraq (NYT Oct. 20) but there is a group of "new Palestinians" who are "more concerned with bettering their lives than with pressing for independence". These are held opposite from "fundamentalists" (NYT Oct. 28). And the "new Palestinians" are entering the modern world: it is news that they arrive at Madrid "armed with faxes," cellular phones and the like.

The London Times appears slightly more "balanced", especially toward the PLO. Arafat is viewed in one article as a "moderate" opposing "PLO radicals" (Oct. 19). (Again, note the frame of individuals in conflict.) The New York Times, reporting this particular PLO meeting, runs a tiny, unauthored story, which says merely that the "PLO announced it had approved Palestinian participation in the peace talks". For all practical purposes, this is true, but the difference is that a London reporter was in fact at the meeting, whereas it appears that the New York Times compiled their story from wire reports or a second-hand account. The differential amounts of information make all the difference. There could be found one bit of more balanced writing in the New York Times: Leslie Gelb's "Foreign Affairs" column of Oct. 30 is "pro-Palestinian" in that he advocates steps to help them; steps Israel is unwilling to take.

There is one other exception to anti-Arab bias: Egypt's late president, Anwar el-Sadat. Soheir Morsy (1985) has observed that since Sadat approached Israel and made peace in 1979, he and his country have undergone a magical transformation in Western media. This is evident today in comparisons to the 1978-9 talks. Richard Beeston, for instance, makes a predictable contrast between Syria's President Assad and Sadat (LT Oct. 26), and Thomas Friedman observes that no Arabs are "approaching the talks as Sadat" did (NYT Oct. 20).

What made the differences in coverage were the different sources used by each paper. I believe Gans' theory that sources -- who usually represent some group or organization -- actively seek out journalists; the sources choose certain journalists and are in turn chosen by some and not others. The sources are also an audience of the journalists, and they are affected by other audiences as well: it is a circular process of information flow.

Geographic distribution of journalists, in coverage of the peace talks, played a large part in determining what information was conveyed. The New York Times' main Middle East correspondent, Thomas Friedman, appeared to be travelling with Baker. He went from Madrid on Oct. 19 to Washington, where he reported a Bush press conference, then back to Madrid for the talks. Youssef Ibrahim was in Riyadh and Paris; Clyde Haberman was in Jerusalem, where he interviewed Shamir on Oct. 25, then went to Gaza and interviewed residents on Oct. 27; Chris Hedges was in Damascus and Cairo. The London Times had Richard Beeston -- who filed most of the conference-related reports -- in Jerusalem and Gaza. There were also Christopher Walker in Sinai and Cairo, and Peter Stothard, the U.S. editor.

There was evidence of reporters' closeness to sources, in statements like "American officials seem to believe..." or "Baker hinted...". There was a lot of information from local newspapers, especially from the New York Times' Ibrahim. There were even a few instances where the London Times quoted from the New York Times, evidence that the latter is, in fact, regarded as the American "agenda-setter". There were also quotes from television -- CBS News, MacNeil/Lehrer, Sunday interview shows, and especially CNN.

Surprisingly, there was only one story that included polls. Chomsky has observed that most polls on the Mideast are conducted by Western or Israeli organizations. But the London Times cited two polls -- one from a Jewish newspaper and one from a Palestinian research center. (Interestingly, most Israelis were more conciliatory than their delegation, and half of Palestinians believed that the U.S. wasn't serious about Middle East peace.)

On one day, both papers quoted a Spanish government spokeswoman ("spokesman" in the London Times) in unauthored articles. But the New York Times' story is upbeat, describing Spanish willingness to host the talks, while London's story is on the confusion and complications involved. This may reflect different "angles" resulting from a single press briefing, or cultural biases. (Speaking of which, it is interesting to note that the Spanish discuss the conference in the metaphor of a dance.)

When reporters lack sources, to avoid making their own overt judgements they turn to "experts" and as Chomsky has shown, these tend to be overwhelmingly Western when it comes to the Mideast. This was confirmed in the present study: The New York Times quoted or cited a total of four U.S., three Israeli, one Palestinian and one Canadian expert. The London Times cited only one "Western" expert. The London Times' dearth of experts, however, is compensated for by their abundant use of diplomats, mostly unnamed ones.

This trend is exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. delegation is itself made up of "experts" (not included in the above count). In the New York Times, they are described as many individuals are: by their credentials and attitudes. Therefore, for instance, Dennis Ross is a Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Office with a UCLA Ph.D who is "analytical, a conceptualizer of new strategies and policies". Richard Haass, a Rhodes scholar from Oxford, is "unsentimental, tough on both Israelis and Arabs" (Oct. 27).

Ultimately, there was some key information that was unreported, further defining the newspapers' frames. For instance, U.S. business interests in the region are mostly ignored. An exception is when the London Times noted that both Coke and Pepsi would be served at the conference, since one is boycotted by Arabs and one by Israelis. US corporate interests also emerged in Bush's opening speech, in the way he framed what "real peace" would mean in the region: "And by real peace I mean treaties. Security. Diplomatic relations. Economic relations. Trade. Investment. Cultural exchange. Even tourism. A Middle East where men and women lead normal lives." (NYT Oct. 30). (Note, also, that the two papers used different punctuation in reporting this speech: the New York Times' version was like that above, but London's version incoporated that list into one sentence, separated by commas. This shows the differential cultural styles, the British using more proper English, and the Americans, rather like the way Bush speaks. Also note that the London Times carried the text of Bush's speech only while the New York Times carried Gorbachev's and a few others.) In Gorbachev's speech, he referred mainly to his own country, showing a bit of his own frame of reference. There were other instances where what was left out is worthy of mention. For instance, it was newsworthy that an "official American silence" greeted an announcement that Arafat would control the Palestinian delegation, and that Shamir would lead his delegation (NYT Oct. 25).

To generally characterize the two papers, some final comments. The New York Times sometimes groups a lot of diverse information in one article, but more often it was the London Times that did this, and in shorter articles than the New York Times (as seen in the total column inch count). The New York Times is not larger in size, but carries more foreign news. There are a lot of transcripts of speeches (a mixed blessing), and generally longer articles with more analysis and interpretation.

The London Times has more "Home News", as it calls it. For instance, on Oct. 31 the New York Times had a four-column (of six) headline on the first day of the talks, and followed with a three-column head the next day. The London Times gave a full-page headline (8 columns) on the 31st, but cut it to three the following day due to a speech by the Queen.

The London Times' articles are much shorter, and frequently group several related stories into one. For instance, there were single stories on the talks and hostage releases, or the talks and violence in Gaza. But by incorporating information from "Richard Beeston and Our Foreign Staff" for example, more diverse views and facts come through. One notable aspect of the London Times' coverage is that it gave more space to opposition to the talks. It reported a speech by Ariel Sharon (Oct. 20); a conference in Iran wih Libya, Iraq and 43 other countries opposed to the Madrid talks (Oct. 21); a denouncement from an ultra-orthodox Jewish sect opposed to Israel's existence (Oct. 23); and a "terror alert" in several countries (from "diplomatic sources"). It reported that Iran's Ali Khamenei called for a "Holy War" against the talks, and that Iraq called the conference a means to "liquidate" the Palestinian issue so the U.S. could dominate the region. It also reported that Saudi Arabia gave the PLO a check for £1.75 million a few days before the talks. All of these were unreported in the New York Times.

But the London Times also seems to follow U.S. Foreign policy too. In editorials, it calls the talks a "triumph for American democracy" and says "the combined pressure of the Soviet Union and the United States can move even the most stubborn politicians, overcome the most intractable hatreds" (Oct. 21); it praised Shamir for going to the talks, (to lend "real power" to the negotiations) and emphasized the need for continuing U.S. involvement (Oct. 25).

The Weeklies

The New Republic and Economist are vastly different publications. The New Republic, an American magazine, contains long opinion pieces on political and cultural subjects, in that order, generally. It is often described as "liberal" but has been drifting rightward lately, under its new editor, Andrew Sullivan. The Economist is a British weekly covering a wide array of world events with an eye, obviously, toward business matters. Its articles vary in length, ranging from single-paragraph blurbs to multipage "surveys" on particular parts of the world. I looked at two issues of each magazine, corresponding to the two weeks covered, but a week later, since they usually wait to digest the previous week's information. In each, there are one or two articles per issue.

In the New Republic, there is some confusion about its cover date. The issue entitled November 11 actually refers to the release date of its next issue; it came out on Nov. 4, and covers the previous week beginning October 30. In this issue the magazine leads with an editorial (p. 7) on the talks, entitled "Madrid Fandango". (Here is the dance metaphor that was seen in Spain but nowhere else.)

The New Republic's editorial stance actually resembles that of the New York Times: there is a distinct bias toward Israel. "Whatever the outcome of the talks," the piece says, "the Arab resentment of a permanent sovereign Jewish presence in the Middle East will continue to exist. And, given the mercurial character of Arab politics, that resentment remains a danger to Israel." It echoes another of A.M. Rosenthal's beliefs: "The Palestinians will have to decide if they are prepared for realism, if they prefer the gradual improvement of their condition to the immidiate gratifications of maximalist speech."

The editors' message is that compromise is preferable, but they direct this at Israel as well, adopting the position of Israel's Labor party and moving slightly to the left of Rosenthal. They say Israel should retain "land that is crucial" but do not define what "crucial" land is. There is also a comparison to Sadat: "... not one of [Israel's] Arab interlocutors has approached Israel in anything remotely resembling the spirit in which it was approached by Anwar Sadat in 1977".

The editorial goes on to specifically attack Syria's Assad, emphasizing his new relationship with the U.S. "In his enthusiasm for Assad, Baker has matched his boss's fondness for Deng Xiaoping..." (p. 8). And it notes the irony of the Soviet presence: "What, for example, is a Soviet government that cannot even enforce order between Armenians and Azerbaijanis doing brokering peace between Israel and the Arabs?" This, they say, is "just another cheap Soviet bid for international legitimacy". Finally, it stresses the complexity of the Mideast: "This is the Middle East, not Houston, Texas [Baker's home town]: here deals are hard . And the stuff of those deals is not only interests, but feelings, memories, symbols, gods". The talks, though, are necessary , it says, "a few moments of truth". The U.S.-engineered "peace process", it conludes, has become a real peace process.

In effect, the frame here is not far removed from the one held by the New York Times, only it says things outright that would never be said there. There is happiness that the Palestinians have finally "come to the table" set by the US and Israel, but there is general gloom that anything will come of the talks, mostly due to inevitable Arab agression. And there is recognition that the Soviet presence is only token.

In the same issue appears a piece by Ehud Ya'ari, the chief Middle East correspondent for Israeli television, entitled "Indifading: The PLO's revolt peters out". At first glance, this contains the same pro-Israeli, anti-Palestinian message, and in essence, it does. But Ya'ari buttresses his argument with a dazzling array of facts that only a local specialist can provide. The article reads a lot like a news report in that it is relatively "objective", with fact after fact to prove that the intifada is falling apart.

But unlike a news account, there are no quotes from "officials" or anyone else, only Ya'ari's own account of the events as he purports to have seen them. His message is encapsulated in the following sentence: "The 'armed struggle' has been reduced to the empty slogan of diehard radicals." This shows his perspectival frame, which is that moderatism and compromise are preferable to continued obstinance and violence on both sides. He notes a parallel situation on the Israeli side as well as the Palestinian: the Israeli forces, even with mass arrests and economic pressures, have not succeeded in "pacifying" the uprising. With all the facts he includes, his account is far more thorough than any found in the New York or London Times, and is very convincing.

In the November 18 issue, there is a piece by staff writer Michael Walzer called "Unquick fix: The peace process begins". He is as skeptical as most coverage, as for example when he says, "It seems fairly certain that delegates from the governments currently in power in the Middle East will reach deadlock within days, if not hours, if not minutes, of their first direct encounter" (p. 13) and "it's hard to forsee anything but trouble".

Walzer views the talks through a historical frame, comparing them to the peace talks that ended the Thirty Years War in 1648. Despite the fact that that conflict is centuries, miles and cultures apart, he manages to draw some parallels. He notes the disputes over the composition of the delegtes, the continuing fighting while the talks proceeded, the breakup into bilateral talks, disputes over etiquette and ceremony, and differences between "hawks" and "doves". From here, he concludes that the present parties should be prepared for long and tortuous negotiations -- "Moments of truth need not be rushed". And he makes some detailed suggestions.

But there are traces of the Orientalist bias here too. He observes, for instance, "the democratic character of Israeli politics and the radical disunity of the Palestinians" (p. 14). (I think that even some Israelis might disagree with him on that point.) Also, he notes, "it's not implausible to argue that Palestinian moderates are too weak to survive even the first small compromises that the conference will require". His tone echoes that of both the New York and London Times, and indeed the views of most commentators. On the other hand, he surprisingly departs from them by saying, "Camp David is not a useful precedent here... " since, back then, peace had already been agreed to by the time the parties sat down to negotiate. But his historical analogy might have been more productive -- and less forced -- if he simply looked back into the history of the Middle East. He does, however, make a point no one else thus far has -- that peace must outlast individual governments and leaders.

The Economist also leads with editorials, but unlike those in the New Republic, the Economist's are much more historically informed, and the editorial viewpoint is more "detatched" and less partisan. Satirical humor infuses both magazines.

In its Oct. 13 leading piece, The Economist (there are no named writers here) says, regarding the peace talks, "consider, for a moment how bizarre this is" that Arabs and Israelis are talking. The fact that it has taken so long for such talks, it says, "is a grotesque indictment of the way human beings organise their affairs". It then goes on to outline the respective positions, and to add historical background. Unlike the New Republic, there is no selective "historical engineering" here. There is much more detail on the region, for, the editorial says, "All of this ancient stuff still matters. History will press like a stone on the conference in Madrid."

In addition, each side is fairly presented. There are more views, in fact, presented here, much like the London Times, as compared to the New York Times. The PLO is presented, as are those of "hardline" Israelis, the Arab League, the Palestinians, and others. Like other commentators, the Economist calls for compromise, something "between the Arab demand for justice and the Israeli demand for security". (Its position is immediately recognizable on its cover, which says, "A Land to Share".) And it recognizes that external powers (the U.S. or the U.N.) should only intervene when necessary. The entire frame appears to be the cold, rational, detatched view of, well, an economist.

In another article in the "International" section (p. 47), entitled "Morosely to Madrid", the talks are viewed as a party. "James Baker's Middle East peace conference [note heroization, as in London Times] kicks off on October 30th in Madrid with all the guests on the invitation list promising to turn up on time in best bib and tucker. How America's secretary of state is to keep them there, let alone coax the correct party pieces out of them, is another matter altogether."

The article goes on to editorialize on the progressive vagueness of each stage of the talks, and suggests that "the PLO may have outwitted the Israelis in the battle over Palestinian representation". (Here is the frame of conflict; it seems to ironically infuse all discussions of the "peace talks".) There is praise for the Palestinian leader, Haider Abdel-Shafi. And like the London Times, it mentions the Teheran conference of "naysayers on the Arab side" and gives their objections. Unlike the New Republic, the editorial tone of the Economist is consistent throughout, perhaps because there are a few writers, all unnamed. It recalls Time magazine when it was under the leadership of Henry Luce.

The leading "International" article on November 2 (p. 37) is authored by "our special correspondent in Madrid". Here, the talks are no longer viewed as a party, but the metaphor of battle is again applied. "As hosts, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev strove to fill Madrid with the clang of swords being beatne into ploughshares." The guests "pretended... to go along with this" but "back in their respective hotels, the delegations produced a different sound: the scrape of bayonets being sharpened for battle." The battle, it is suggested, "will be for the mind of America". The article speaks of the "far-off days before the Gulf War" and how much has changed. It suggests that the US, after that conflict, went from "an intimate ally" of Israel to "a mere 'honest broker'". (Here is the language of finance.)

Later, the party metaphor is resurrected: "Like guests invited to a party whose host locks the doors and then vanishes, the Arab and Israeli delegations were left to wonder what they had let themselves in for." America's role in the Middle East is presupposed: "Nobody in Madrid took too seriously Mr. Bush's claim that he will stand loftily aside while the region sorts out itwo won troubles." But at the end, the tone is optimistic, and shatters the party metaphor: "But Madrid was not just a party piece, put on by reluctant guests to satisfy a demanding host." The talks are praised: "Peace is still far off, but the Middle East will not be the same again." An attatched article gives a rundown of the issues, with certain key words in bold print, like "borders", "Resolution 242", the "United States" and so on . It is entitled, "Simple, Really".

The overall frame of the Economist is one of geopolitics as they affect economics, and vice versa. The view is sufficiently "detatched" from most events that it can "objectively" view all parties, and can add some levity, in the inimitable style the magazine is famous for. It, like the New Republic and the two newspapers, contains hints of ethnocentrism but slightly less so than the more partisan New Republic.

Conclusion

Orientalism still exists, but it appears to have been affected by world events. Throughout coverage of the Mideast peace talks, there are assertions that the Cold War is over, so any U.S. bias should soon end. But it would be ludicrous to suggest that the end of a bilateral world means the end of Orientalism. Indeed, the Mideast is still viewed as a hostile, infinitely foreign place that is difficult for Westerners to understand. And the end of the Cold War will probably have the effect of heightening intervention in the region, so propaganda efforts -- selective history, stereotyping, ethnocentrism -- could very well increase. The danger is that these presumptions are increasingly buried in the "arch¾ological level" of discourse, not in the open, so they are more apt to be internalized in people. In a political magazine such as the New Republic, partisan statements are more in the open; in a business weekly like the Economist, judgements are couched in the cold, rational language of international finance. In daily news coverage, the key seems to lie in the geographical distribution of reporters, their ability to ferret out a variety of diverse information (depending on their language skills and contacts) and whatever political agenda their editors might have.

If I were to propose another way to frame coverage, it would emphasize a greater amount of diverse information. Since this is virtually impossible due to financial and political obstacles, I would favor digesting more information from other "native" newspapers, as Youssef Ibrahim often does. This requires language capabilities and the ability to discern the sources behind the information and their motives. But the knowledge a local journalist applies to an event is infinitely better than relying on Western "experts" who are tied to governments. The World Press Review serves up a wide array of diverse facts and viewpoints, if selectively. Generally, the New York Times is thorough, but must be read critically and in addition to other publications. The view of C. Wright Mills seems to hold true:

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