by Kevin Walker
University of California, Berkeley
October 16, 1990
One month ago, I wrote about the problems created by the press strictures imposed by the U.S. government in its present military deployment in the Middle East. I would like to take a closer look at the issue now, with a special focus on the Pentagon's use of the "press pool" -- a selected group of reporters chosen to accompany U.S. troops and provide their reports to other news organizations. Without a solution, the issue is bound to increase tensions already evident between the government and news media.
A look at the history of this issue provides some clues to the nature of the problem. In World War II, the first major conflict to be extensively covered by both print and broadcast news media, journalists were generally allowed to accompany U.S. soldiers, even on commando operations. The press accepted censorship of certain information -- exact troop locations, casualty counts -- usually without question.
The same was true during the Korean War. The precedent for intentional restriction of media coverage of a military operation by the government seems to have been during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. In the midst of the Cold War, the Kennedy adminstration placed a high priority on secrecy in military matters, and it cited the covert nature of the CIA-run operation as a reason for barring reporters. During the Cuban missile crisis the following year, reporters were not allowed aboard U.S. warships involved in the blockade of missile-carrying Soviet ships, but the administration later conceded that this had been a mistake.
The Johnson administration had a more open relationship with the press. When marines were deployed to the Dominican Republic in 1965, reporters were included from the very beginning. Under Johnson, then Nixon, the Vietnam War would become the first and only "uncensored war" -- with open, unrestricted press coverage. To gain access, journalists had to agree to 15 rules barring them from reporting certain specific military information, such as troop movements and exact casualty figures. But they also signed a waiver releasing the government from fiscal responsibility in the case of death or injury; the press took responsibility for their own safety. Reporters could freely roam the country, whether on their own or in the company of U.S. servicemen, and they were rarely prevented from recording "firefights." Eating and sleeping beside soldiers, they provided the American public with a close-up view of war that had never been seen before.
But such vivid pictures had an adverse effect on public sentiment at home. This began a significant shift in the relationship between the press and the White House, a rift which would widen in the next few years with the Pentagon Papers and Watergate incidents. When Ronald Reagan took office in 1980, he brought with him a staff that was well-rehearsed in secrecy and media manipulation. Reagan rode in on a growing wave of conservatism, and a growing contempt for the press, by both the government and the public.
The Grenada invasion in October, 1983 inaugurated the use of the "press pool." In the first days of the invasion, no reporters were included at all, and some officials even blatantly misled the press by denying initial invasion reports. The administration cited two reasons for barring reporters: (A) the need for secrecy, and (B) the element of danger. Journalists had to rely on reports from Havana or Barbados, or from ham radio operators in the area, who soon drew FCC attention for using unauthorized frequencies.
The press was furious, and they rejected both of the administration's reasons. The Washington Post's Howard Simmons said, "I think a secret war, like secret government, is antithetical to an open society," and the New York Times' Seymour Topping stressed that "the American people require all the facts to make judgements about the actions of our government."1
This reasoning is sound, but the problem is that the very goals of the administration were to keep both the press and the public in the dark, at least until they could plant the American flag and claim victory. In addition to the lessons of Vietnam, the White House had learned from Britain's tight control of press coverage in their 1981 conflict with Argentina. In the Falklands war, reporters were allowed on British warships, and later onto the islands, but their reports were censored by the government. The U.S. commanding general conceded that this had made an impression on him, and said that he thought there was too much press coverage of the military anyway.
Nevertheless, the Pentagon, a few days after the invasion, agreed to reconcile with the press, and created a pool of 15 journalists that would be allowed to Grenada for a day. This first group of reporters, however, were prevented from using military communications equipment, and had to wait until returning to Barbados to file their reports because communications were down in Grenada. This further infuriated the press. They said the restrictions "go beyond the normal limits of military censorship," and spoke of a "policy of secret wars hidden from the American people."2.
Besides the secrecy and danger issues, there were questions about the pool itself. Among the 15 reporters in the pool were representatives from the three TV networks and the wire services, but none from newspapers or newsmagazines. In addition, the pool was essentially a guided five-hour tour by the military, which had left many questions were unanswered, such as the degree of Soviet and Cuban involvement, the level of fighting, the number of casualties, the conduct of U.S. soldiers, the attitudes of the Grenadian people, and so on. Some misinformation came to light: the administration had inflated estimates of Cuban strength, had wrongly asserted the presence of a "terrorist training base" as a cause for the invasion, and initially denied that there were civilian casualties.
Congress now turned on the administration, too. Senator Paul Sarbanes attacked the secrecy, saying the issue raised "disturbing questions about our functioning as a free society." And Senator Nancy Kassenbaum said that reporters had worked "under far worse circumstances in Lebanon."3 In a House subcommitee hearing, Representative Robert Kastenmeier said "the pendulum has begun to swing back toward restrictions on civil liberties." It was agreed that press curbs would be acceptable in certain circumstances, such as the 1980 attempt to rescue hostages in Iran. But as CBS's Edward Joyce observed at the hearing, the Reagan administratio had "introduced a new relationship with the press, a relationship virtually unknown in U.S. history." After the Senate adopted an amendment to a pending debt limit bill, which declared that "restrictions imposed upon the press in Grenada shall cease," the White House eased the press curbs. The administration did not fully accede, however. It flew reporters to the island and allowed them to stay as long as they wished, but didn't offer any further aid, such as land transportation, housing, food or communications facilities.
After Grenada, the administration created a panel of military officers and journalists to try to resolve the issue. The panel was headed by Winant Sidle, a retired general who had been chief of military information in Vietnam and was currently head of public relations for a large defense contractor.5 The commission recommended that a "select pool of reporters be allowed to cover the early stages of any surprise operation and share its information with other news organizations."6 The compromise seemed fair to both the press and the Pentagon, and was reluctantly agreed upon by both. In 1986, the Defense Department created a rotating press pool to cover military operations. It would include photographers and reporters from print, broadcast and wire services, and is to be ready to go on short notice, in secrecy, with U.S. troops.
The first test came in Panama in December, 1989, with George Bush having succeeded Reagan. The system failed miserably for the press. The 16-person pool was not flown to Panama until four hours after the invasion began, and couldn't file a story for another six hours after that. Even as hordes of other reporters arrived on the scene, the pool was kept locked in a room on a U.S. military base. No civilian official accompanied the pool. The Pentagon spokesman characterized the military's handling of the matter in a word: "incompetence." Additionally, casualty counts and other specific information was slanted by administration officials.
The Pentagon's response was similar to before -- it commissioned a report. But this time, instead of a panel, one individual was chosen to handle the matter. Fred Hoffman was a former Pentagon spokesman who had recently turned journalist: now he was the Pentagon correspondent for the Associated Press. His report was much more critical of the administration, and it directly blamed Defense Secretary Dick Cheney for the Panama blunder, citing "excessive concern for secrecy." The report, based on interviews with officials, said that a detailed plan for news coverage was not consulted because it was locked away in a safe to prevent disclosure.
Hoffman made 17 recommendations, including: That all future war plans have an annex "spelling out measures to insure that the [press] pool will move with the lead elements of U.S. forces and cover the earliest stages of operations;" that the military have helicopters available to reporters for "ready access to the earliest action"; that the pool be allowed on periodic military exercises involving units most likely to see combat, such as airborne and reconnaisance units; and that the Defense Secretary draw up a policy directive to give full support to pool reporters. Cheney responded that he would "try to insure that reporters are able to cover the start of any future conflicts, and the Pentagon agreed to "take steps to make it easier for the press to cover military operations." In effect, they agreed to review the 17 recommendations, but not necessarily adopt them.7
Perhaps not surprisingly, the report has dissappeared from view since its issue in March, and the entire issue might have been completely lost in all the recent talk of "peace dividends" and world peace. But, unresolved, it was bound to resurface in the next conflict. This occurred two months ago, after Iraq invaded Kuwait.
When U.S. troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia, the press pool was again absent. When asked why, Defense Secretary Cheney joked that it was the Pentagon's fault! The administration had excuses, however, some valid, others not. Cheney was quick to add that "Saudi Arabia's a sovereign nation. They have their own rules and regulations and requirements, and they establish the ground rules under which people have access to cover activities inside the kingdom. That's not something we have control over."
It is true that Saudi Arabia has a history of refusing to issue visas -- even tourist visas -- to foreign reporters, but the press still attacked Cheney for not vigorously pressing the Saudis to allow reporters. If they could break tradition by allowing a foreign army, why not allow the reporters that (used to) accompany that army? The Los Angeles Times' editor, Shelby Coffey, said, "I think it's quite likely that if the Pentagon wanted to do this, the reporters would be there." The New York Times' Max Frankel was more direct: "A major military exercise cannot succeed without the sustained support and understanding of the American people, and it will not long be supported or understood without extensive and close-up news reporting."
But President Bush was adamant; he said that "there's plenty of reporters in Saudi Arabia right now," (which, if he was referring to American reporters, was not true), and an aide revealed that he wasn't inclined to field a pool unless there was actual combat. Congress has been content to watch from the sidelines in the latest round.8
Meanwhile, the press, barred even from U.S. ships in the area, was forced to rely on reports without pictures. The Defense Department wasn't providing any -- they said that military camera teams had not taken electronic transmitters with them. The networks resorted to stock newsreel clips, maps, graphics, background reports, and experts, experts, experts -- most working for, or retired from, the Pentagon.
Lacking pictures and "hard news" about the crisis, the media were more open to propaganda of all kinds. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait hired public relations agencies, who distributed glossy booklets and video news releases to the press. Saddam Hussein, reportedly an avid viewer of CNN, used the network to broadcast some of his own public relations material. Even a CNN anchor said, "No one needs to hire a P.R. firm in a situation like this because the networks are competing with eachother." CBS seemed to hold the lead in invasion non-news when it aired a piece on the sights of Cairo, but NBC surpassed it with a profile of Egypt's Omar Sharif, complete with clips from Lawrence of Arabia.9
A pool was eventually admitted, after the Saudi government began granting visas. The stories it provided, however, were not much of an improvement in "news value." Under such vague datelines as "In the Persian Gulf" and "In Saudi Arabia," stories emerged about nameless American troops setting up shop in the desert, and the big story seemed to be the heat. Neither names of enlisted men nor exact locations could be disclosed, and the military provided only guided tours, as in Grenada.
The restriction on names was soon lifted, and most others were, after the networks seemed to be more succesful at getting information on their own: The Washington Post had a correspondent, Caryle Murphy, in Kuwait, who went nameless once the fighting began; first ABC then CBS were invited into Baghdad, to be used as conduits for Saddam Hussein's rhetoric; and The New York Times' foreign editor said he thought the pool didn't matter, saying, "We've done much better with our own people."10
Presently, there are correspondents from all the major news organizations in the Gulf, making periodic trips into Baghdad, and stationed at various places around the region. Reports from Saudi Arabia, however, are still labeled with vague locations so as to mask exact locations of U.S. troops.
Technology has provided the means for the press to overcome government strictures. In 1983, the press did not have portable satellite transponders. They can now pack a small amount of gear on a plane, truck or boat, and literally transmit from the middle of the desert. As in many communications areas, technology has surpassed regulation, and this is a broad issue which is to complex to explore here.
The issue underlying the press pool debate is that of the changing relationship between the press and White House. Without a doubt, times have changed since Walter Cronkite read presidential statements over the air verbatim. The trend toward an adversarial relationship reflects more than changing presidents: it has been part of the swinging of the political pendulum toward conservatism. Only now, in the wake of the military and financial scandals of the Reagan years, does the pendulum show any sign of swinging back.
Changing administrations are a key to a possible solution, however. Just as the Bush administration chose not to abide by accomodations seemingly made in the Reagan era, some future administration may be more friendly to the press. But an executive nod is hardly a solution; a more long-term solution would prevent executive loopholes in press coverage of military operations. Without firm rules or written policy governing when and how reporters should be allowed on the scene of combat, administrations will naturally act in their own interests.
A solution could take the form of legislation, and of course, this would involve Congress. But Congress has chosen to stay out of the present battle, and indeed the press-military issue seems quite minor compared to other issues facing Congress.
After Grenada, a bill was amended to sufficiently scare the White House into giving way. But this did not, could not, change the White House's attitude, and the steps it did take in concilliation were mostly symbolic. When misinformation came to light about Grenada, Congress was quick to take up the issue, with subcommitee hearings in both houses. But no legislation emerged, only rhetoric. After Grenada and Panama, the issue quickly dissappeared from view, and this time it is even more likely to do so, since Congress has not even blinked an eye.
Steps taken by the executive branch to address the issue include two commissioned reports and pledges to be more accomodating. The recommendations made by the reports were reasonable, but since the administration was not obliged to abide by them, it did not. But the issue has caused shakeups in the executive branch: A Reagan deputy press secretary resigned during the fallout from Grenada, and the Air Force chief of staff was recently fired by Defense Secretary Cheney for disclosing too much information to the press.
This latest case is interesting because it reveals how the press and White House work togther. The information revealed by Gen. Michael Dugan had been reported in the press, through anonymous, "off-the-record" accounts and intentional leaks. But Dugan went "on-record" with the information, giving it an official stamp of credibility. The firing of Dugan only underscores the continuing scorn of the press by the White House. It is obvious that, in the current administration, no steps will be taken to open up to the press. The solution must come from elsewhere.
Could judicial action work? Judging from related cases, it might. In the Pentagon Papers case for instance, the court ruled in favor of The New York Times for running a classified Pentagon report. But the entire case was almost a mockery, and a decision the other way might not have made much difference. If a news organization were to sue the Pentagon for withholding information from the public, or restricting the press from doing its job, its only legal grounding would be the First Amendment. The Pentagon's defense for barring reporters would probably be similar to Reagan's Grenada reasonings -- the need for secrecy and the element of danger. The latter point is easily disposed of, and the former is an issue that is becoming more visible in the public arena. With governmental scandals continuing to hit the papers these days, the public is becoming acutely aware of the executive branch's love of secrecy.
The reason the issue of press restrictions has faded quickly, and the reason Congress has been so quick to abandon it, is that the public simply does not side with the press. In the House hearing after Grenada, journalists conceded that the battle would not be easy to win for this reason. By making an issue of the restrictions, they place their credibility at risk. The press argues that the public needs information from impartial sources, but the public has come to view the press as adversaries of the government, as indeed the case seems to be. NBC's John Chancellor, at the hearing, said it was especially difficult to conjure public support at the time because the Grenada invasion was a success; he said that letters he received in response to NBC's criticism of the censorship favored the government's position 10-to-1. The same may be said of the favorable public reception to the Panama invasion and the current action. These two situations, in fact, seem more justified to the public because the enemies -- Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein -- provoked U.S. action and broke international laws. Polls reflected the wide margin of support for the White House.
What exactly does the press want? As the Bernard Weintraub observed:
Simply put, reporters want to cover combat like they used to. But in the absence of written rules regarding combat coverage, recent administrations have become stricter in their control of information. As a result, reporters have been forced to change their methods of reporting, and had to rely more on official sources.
But legislation or judicial action, while desirable, may not be necessary. The current Mideast situation shows that technology may allow the press to get information whether the government likes it or not. With CNN and other instant satellite feeds, battle coverage could conceivably be instantaneous. But this would only serve to intensify the conflict between press and government. This seems to be occurring.
One favorable solution was recently proposed by NBC News president Michael Gartner at a recent conference in San Jose. He voted in favor of pools -- but ones organized by the press themselves. Economic and personnel constraints are the motivating factors behind this solution.12 Networks already have a longstanding agreeement to share video from shuttle launches, presidential conventions, congressional hearings and presidential press conferences. Gartner proposed extending this for other stories: "As we move into the 1990's, the networks will have to pool on much of the generic news in order to redirect resources to the producers and reporters and editors and crews that we so desperatey need to seek the exclusive, the unique, the investigative, the explanatory."13
But while this may work for "generic news," and seems reasonable due to the high costs of covering an event such as that in the Middle East, it is unlikely that all news organizations will agree to this, especially in a war, when they will be scrambling to get the best footage. They believe the public watches whomever is closest to the action, and the closer the networks' star anchors are to the action, the more airtime it receives.14 But the costs of covering such an event are indeed a factor that lend credence to the use of pools.
This does not diminish the issue of government secrecy on military operations. Obviously, press pools have not worked, and the most favorable solution seems to be legislation clearly outlining when the press should be allowed on military missions, where they can roam, and what they can report. A secondary choice is judicial action. A clearly defined legal framework is the only way to prevent the inevitable confrontations that will arise as technology progresses and news organizations get together in reporting certain events.
1. Quoted in Gailey, Phil. "U.S. Bars Coverage of Grenada Action; News Groups Protest." New York Times, Oct. 26, 1983, 1:6.
2. The American Society of Newspaper Editors and American Newspaper Publishers Association were quoted in Farrell, William E. "U.S Allows 15 Reporters to Go to Grenada for Day." New York Times, Oct. 28, 1990, I, 13:5.
3. Ibid. Regarding Lebanon, it is interesting to note that the Grenada invasion occurred one day after a U.S. marine barracks was bombed in Lebanon. Mark Hertsgaard, in On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency, concludes that the Grenada invasion served two purposes: to divert public attention away from Lebanon, and to boost Reagan's support for the 1984 election, since it had been flagging due to a recession and a growing public perception that Reagan was inept and blind to events within his own administration.
4. Quoted in Burnham, David. "Curbs on Grenada News Coverage Criticized in House Hearing." New York Times, Nov. 3, 1983, I, 21:5.
5. Sidle received mixed reviews from reporters that were in Vietnam -- some said he had done a good job within government military policy, and some felt that the communiques he issued had been inadequate or misleading. He had suspended one reporter from Vietnam for reporting a U.S. troop movement that the reporter said was well known to the enemy.
6. Reported in New York Times editorial, Jan. 15, 1990, I, 16:1.
7. Gordon, Michael R. "Pentagon to Aid the Press in Coverage of Combat." New York Times, Mar. 21, 1990, B, 1:2
8. Jones, Alex S. "News Organizations Angry At the Lack of a Press Pool." New York Times, Aug. 10, 1990, I, 13:5.
9. Elson, John. "And on This Map We SeeÉ " Time, Aug. 27, 1990, p. 37.
10. Quoted in Gersh, Debra. "Pentagon Press Pool Disbands." Editor and Publisher, Sept. 1, 1990, p. 35.
11. Weintraub, Bernard. "U.S. Press Curbs: The Unanswered Questions." New York Times, Oct. 29, 1983, I, 1:1
12. NBC is launching a 24-hour, satellite-delivered news service, which will use footage from several affiliates. NBC News investigative reports are not to be included in the pooled footage.
13. "Gartner Backs Network and Affiliate Pools." Broadcasting, Oct. 1, 1990, p. 47.
14. For more on this, see Diamond, Edwin. "Big Feet in the Sand." New York, Sept. 3, 1990, p. 10.